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Abstract—With an increasing degree of automation, automated
vehicle systems become more complex in terms of functional
components as well as interconnected hardware and software
components. Thus, holistic systems engineering becomes a severe
challenge. Emergent properties like system safety are not solely
arguable in singular viewpoints such as structural representations
of software or electrical wiring (e.g. fault tolerant). This states
the need to get several viewpoints on a system and describe
correspondences between these views in order to enable trace-
ability of emergent system properties. Today, the most abstract
view found in architecture frameworks is a logical description
of system functions which structures the system in terms of
information flow and functional components. In this article we
extend established system viewpoints towards a capability-based
assessment of an automated vehicle and conduct an exemplary
safety analysis to derive behavioral safety requirements. These
requirements can afterwards be attributed to different viewpoints
in an architecture frameworks and thus be integrated into a
development process for automated vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
While more and more OEMs, tech-companies, and research
facilities demonstrate automated driving, ensuring safety of
these vehicles is still an unsolved topic. Developing safe
vehicles is a complex task, involving multiple viewpoints on
the system under development. Koopmann and Wagner point
out that ’ensuring the safety of fully autonomous vehicles
requires a multidisciplinary approach across all the levels of
functional hierarchy’ [1, p. 1].
When involving multiple disciplines in systems engineering,
there are several concerns on the system which need to be
addressed in architectural viewpoints. Those viewpoints have
to be translated or connected to each other, not only for
identifying and developing all required details of a safe system,
but also for creating a holistic systems engineering process.
Systems engineering also puts high demands on traceability
to argue a sufficient level of safety, since absolute safety is
neither possible nor provable. Behere et al. [2] also conclude
a workshop with many senior system architects from a broad
cross-section of the industry that correctness by construction
will play a significant role in development of autonomous
systems. Correctness by construction can be translated to
safety by design can in terms of safety and can only be
provided by multidisciplinary and cross-domain efforts from
academic disciplines [2].
The need for a holistic engineering process is also demanded
by emergent properties of a complex system. According to
Checkland, emergence is “the principle that entities exhibit
properties which are meaningful only when attributed to the
whole, not to its parts.” [3, p. 314]. Related to safety, this
means that safety of an automated vehicle can not solely be
analyzed or verified by looking at, for example, a hardware
architecture. Therefore, requirements and concepts for safe
vehicles must be derived in a top down development process
which incorporates different views on a system at all abstrac-
tion levels. Waymo [4] recently described multiple aspects
of safety: behavioral safety, functional safety, crash safety,
operational safety, and non-collision safety.
Functional safety for automated vehicles is addressed by
standards like the ISO 26262. The main focus of functional
safety is on reaching low hardware failure rates together with
high software quality. The according safety requirements result
from a risk assessment which is solely based on potential fail-
ures of the E/E-system. Functionally safe systems ensure that
functional (safety) requirements are correctly implemented
according to the demands of the automotive safety integrity
level (ASIL) rating.
The question whether a driving function under normal
operation behaves in a safe way is not scope of the ISO 26262
and part of behavioral safety. Therefore, efforts like safety of
the intended functionality1 (SOTIF) are currently developed
complementary to the ISO 26262 standard. Additionally, the
normative concerns on the behavior of automated vehicles are
discussed by other institutions like ethics commissions [5]
and government agencies [6]. An example of the difference
between behavioral and functional safety is given by a hazard
analysis and risk assessment we conducted for an unmanned
protective vehicle [7]. The unmanned protective vehicle is
designed to follow a working vehicle with up to 6.5 mph auto-
mated and unmanned on the hard shoulder of a motorway. Dur-
ing the analysis we, investigated possible scenarios with and
without possible failures of E/E-systems. In scenarios without
1ISO/WD PAS 21448 - under development
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failures, we found some cases where the responsibilities of the
construction workers with respect to the system were unclear.
These cases can lead to mode confusion where the unmanned
operation of the protective vehicle could have been activated
in unwanted or forbidden scenarios. Therefore, we defined
a feedback on the item definition from the hazard analysis
and risk assessment to ensure a safe definition of the driving
function under normal operation. If the components which
implement the possible mode confusion were only investigated
towards functional safety, the system would contain hazards in
high quality software running on fail-safe or fail-operational
hardware. This example shows the necessity of a hierarchical
or parallel analysis of the (externally visible) behavior and
the (internal) system behavior which are connected through
requirements during the development process. Johansson et
al. [8] also argue that functional safety for autonomy2 is not
covered by the ISO 26262 standard. They conclude that the
semantics of safety requirements (’What does the autopilot
do?’ [8, p. 12]) are strongly connected to the architectural
allocation of functions and elements in the system (’Where
does the autopilot hide?’ [8, p. 12]).
emphOperational safety is meant to analyze how humans
and other traffic participants interact with the automated
vehicle. This viewpoint of safety on the system also defines
important requirements but is not the scope of our investiga-
tion in this article. Crash and non-collision safety are more
“classical” viewpoints on the vehicle which are covered and
well investigated in today’s development processes.
This article shows an approach how safety requirements
derived from behavioral safety can be modeled in an capability
based viewpoint and afterwards be allocated into a functional
system architecture which represents the functional structure
of the system. Based on the functional system architecture
and the modeled requirements from behavioral safety, we
can conduct an analysis on functional safety. This top-down
development of requirements and viewpoints enables holistic
systems engineering for safe automated vehicles.
The next section reviews current architectural viewpoints
and architecture meta models and formulates research needs.
Afterward, we describe our approach based on an example
scenario at a pedestrian crossing. At the end we, conclude our
results and show links to existing architecture frameworks.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first describe related work in architecture
frameworks and afterwards discuss contributions to logical
architectures covering safety aspects.
A. Architecture Frameworks
Multiple viewpoints covering concerns towards a system
have been discussed extensively in literature. The basic need
for viewpoints was already stated by Dijskstra as “separation
of concerns” [9] for software intense systems. The main idea
2Since functional safety for autonomy is further defined as the system level
behavior of all items in certain scenarios, we assume this term to be equivalent
to behavioral safety.
is, that a single architecture or viewpoint cannot cover all
concerns on a system.
The ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 [10] standard describes a meta
model for architecture frameworks which focuses on a pro-
cess to identify stakeholders, concerns and viewpoints, and
how architecture descriptions shall be formulated. However,
definitions of concrete concerns or viewpoints are not covered
by the standard. The basic concepts and relations between the
described elements of the standard are shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Concepts of the ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 [10]
A system is working in an environment which can have
other systems or be a physical environment. Automated ve-
hicles will mostly operate in public traffic. Stakeholders then
have concerns on a system. In this contribution we focus on
the safety concern which influences multiple viewpoints as
introduced in the previous section. The system then can be
modeled in several architectures which contain requirements
resulting from concerns. An architecture is based on an archi-
tecture description which is a blueprint containing elements
which can be used. The standard also describes how different
architectures correspond to each other which is important to
trace architectural decisions throughout the life cycle of a
system.
Broy et al. [11] propose a holistic architecture framework
for the automotive industry. The taxonomy is based on a
draft version of the later ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010. The authors
propose three levels of abstraction for architecture starting
from the most abstract functional architectures. Functional
architectures are detailed by logical architectures and then
implemented by technical architectures. The mandatory view-
points for the framework are functional, technical, information,
driver/vehicle operations and value net. Safety is an exam-
ple of an optional viewpoint which cross cuts the proposed
framework. One of the main motivations to utilize model based
development through the architectures is that requirements are
neither complete nor static at the beginning of development
and have to be analyzed and defined recursively throughout
the process. Since the framework does not explicitly model or
analyze safety of automotive systems, we see our approach in
this contribution as an additional architecture viewpoint and
requirement refinement process. Our results can later be used
in the existing framework to model safety as an orthogonal or
emergent property of a system in several architectures.
B. System Architectures & Performance Monitoring
Functional system architectures are mostly based on the
information processing of human beings. Thus, architectures
are a representation of functionalities, which a system provides
in order to fulfill its purpose. Rasmussen [12] divides the
human processing regarding the granularity of behavior and
access to the necessary knowledge. Donges [13] derives a three
layer model of human driving behavior based on Rasmussens‘
skills, rules, and knowledge layers.
The necessity for performance monitoring in hierarchical
systems [14], AI-systems in general [15] and automated
vehicle systems [16], respectively, has already been formu-
lated several decades ago. As a consequence, Maurer and
Dickmanns [17] propose a functional system architecture for
vision-based autonomous road vehicle guidance, which was
explicitly extended by performance monitoring by Maurer
[18]. In the architecture every module contributing to ful-
fill the driving task shall provide quality measures which
are aggregated in a performance monitoring and assessed
during behavior decision. The practical examples from the
demonstrating vehicles VaMoRs and VAmP distinguish meta
information and quality measures for performance monitoring.
Meta information is collected as heartbeats and message
counters to determine if sensors and software processes are
running. Quality measures are presented for the execution of
control algorithms in terms of transient response, overshoot
width and control deviation. Performance monitoring is also
classified as a safety executive design pattern which indicates
that the monitoring is part of a safety concept which was not
further defined in the thesis.
Pellkofer [19] and Siedersberger [20] concretize the con-
cepts of Maurer: They further define capabilities needed for
the driving task and propose a technical framework for mon-
itoring agents which execute capabilities (Siedersberger) and
use the resulting measures in the behavior decision (Pellkofer).
To model and analyze hierarchical dependencies of capabilities
regarding the driving task they introduce the so called capa-
bility net. The hierarchy starts from abstract behavior (e.g.
free driving) to the implementation narrow capabilities in the
system (e.g. control lateral movement or perceiving lanes).
Reschka et al. [21] propose a surveillance system based on
performance criteria for the (Automation Level 2) research
vehicle Leonie in the project Stadtpilot. Performance criteria
for the system are identified based on functional degradation
strategies which are part of the safety concept for the vehicle.
Since Level 2 automation relies on a human supervisor as a
fall-back strategy, the demanded state in case of performance
degradation is a request for takeover.
Bergmiller [22] uses the concept of capabilities to describe
and monitor the performance of the over-actuated by-wire
demonstration vehicle MOBILE. The work details movement
capabilities with concepts of sports psychology and introduces
a fuzzy based framework to determine the actual performance
of actuation system and outlines the possibilities of functional
redundancies in case of actuator errors or failures.
To summarize previous work, we identified a semantic gap
between the abstract concepts of capabilities for fulfilling a
driving mission [18], the first technical concepts [19], [20],
as well as the fuzzy-logic-based framework for performance
calculation [22] for functional safety. This semantic gap can
be addressed by behavioral safety requirements based on a
functional hazard analysis in a development process for Level
3 and 4 automation. Therefore, we presented an approach
how safety requirements can be mapped to a knowledge
based system to determine the actual performance compared
to behavioral safety requirements in the limited use case of an
unmanned protective vehicle [23]. In this contribution we will
describe how the proposed and implemented concepts of the
previously mentioned authors can be embedded in a top-down
development of requirements and how these requirements can
be allocated in corresponding architectural views.
A singular perspective on functionality is not sufficient. Es-
pecially when it comes to developing an autonomous vehicle, a
deeper review of constraints and requirements (e.g. regarding
performance) is necessary for structuring an overall system.
Coste-Manie`re and Simmons [24] states that architectures
are the foundation of designing, implementing and validating
robotic systems. Depending on the needs of the different
applications provided in a system, different architectures are
necessary.
Regarding safety goals and the resulting requirements, func-
tionalities provided by a system have to be defined. Becker et
al. [25] discuss requirements for maintaining a safe state of a
vehicle at any time. For that reason, the system needs to detect
an occurring fault and, afterwards, transfer the vehicle into a
predefined safe state. The duration of this process depends on
a variety of parameters, e.g. the type of automated function
and the driving conditions. As a prerequisite for a fall back
mode, the vehicle has to be equipped with redundancies in case
of degraded functionality. This applies to every component
implementing a specific function (e.g. the communication
network) and depends on the degree of relevance for meeting
the safety goals. However, the relevant components are not
visible in a singular architecture.
Jo et al. [26] describe a development process for automated
vehicles. The process includes a basic structure (following the
“sense-plan-act” pattern) and holds a “system management”
module, which, among other things, detects faults occurring
in the system and, if necessary, changes the driving mode into
“manual”. Hence, the fault management algorithm monitors
the health status of the overall system and degrades its
functionality if the system reaches an unsafe state. In addition,
a software architecture and its modules are derived from the
basic structure and afterwards the implemented modules are
mapped to a distributed component architecture. Although
the perspectives are linked, there is no holistic architecture
framework. Hence, requirements and constraints between the
architectural perspectives are not visible and therefore not
traceable.
Despite the early presented contributions on architectures
and performance monitoring, Tas et al. [27] propose a func-
tional system architecture, which includes concepts for mon-
itoring system performance and can thus provide information
about the current reliability of the functionality w.r.t. the
system. Besides a “sense - plan - act” structure, each functional
model contains additional modules for monitoring, which is
similar to the demanded quality measures in the presented
approach of Maurer [18]. Eventually, the information about the
performance gathered in the single components is fused within
a “system performance assessment” block. As the performance
assessment is located orthogonal and seemingly independent
from the focus on information flow in the architecture, this
contribution gives a hint that a functional architecture does not
cover the concerns of performance monitoring and reliability
in a system.
Bach et al. [28] propose a taxonomy of upcoming E/E-
features and categorize these into integrated, distributed and
cross-linked features. The features are then assigned to the cat-
egories according to their used functional range in the system.
Integrated features are local functions which are directly cou-
pled to a hardware component like anti-lock braking or engine
control. Distributed features make use of multiple integrated
features and combine them to a chain of functions with use of
extrospective sensors like lane keeping assist or adaptive cruise
control. The most complex cross-linked features then add a
complementary environment model to fulfill parts of the whole
driving task like a lane change assist or a highway pilot. The
features are then modeled in a hierarchical logical architecture
with a physics, a raw information, a filtered information and
an interpreted information level. The taxonomy covers safety
systems, but the resulting architecture only shows information
flow, connectivity and logically clustered functions.
In summary, the introduced approaches highlight different
aspects of structuring overall systems. In order to develop a
safe system, it is indispensable to also define the dependencies
(via requirements, constraints etc.) between these perspectives.
III. BEHAVIORAL SAFETY IN ARCHITECTURAL VIEWS
In the following, we describe an example scenario and
derive a behavioral safety strategy based on an exemplary
hazard analysis. Afterwards, we present how the scenario-
specific behavior of an automated vehicle can be expressed in a
functional system architecture and a more dynamic capability
based view on the system. Note, that the term behavior in our
understanding describes the externally visible system behavior
in contrast to most of the contributions in the related work
section. Previous publications consider the internal system
(i.e. software-, or hardware-) behavior while we focus on the
externally visible system behavior, more in line with previous
own publications [23] and Waymo’s formulation of behavioral
safety.
A. Example scenario and safety assessment
Fig. 2 serves as an example of an inner-city scenario to
determine an exemplary safety goal. We choose a worst-case
based risk assessment [29], based on a language description
of a scenario, as this provides a basis for qualitative risk
assessment than a quantitative approach starting at a very
detailed level. The scenarios evolves as follows: An automated
vehicle approaches a pedestrian crossing at 25 mph. A van is
parking in front of the pedestrian crossing halfway on the side
walk. There is oncoming traffic approaching the automated
vehicle and two pedestrians standing at the pedestrian crossing.
The pedestrians are occluded from the point-of-view of the
automated vehicle.
Ego
Car 1
Pedestrian 1 Pedestrian 2
Van
Fig. 2. Example scenario at a pedestrian crossing with a parked van and
oncoming traffic
While there are multiple possible accidents in this particular
scenario, we will focus on the accident:
A-1: Deadly injuries to pedestrians at a pedestrian crossing.
The externally visible behavior of the automated vehicle can
be divided into lateral and longitudinal behavior. With these
categories we can systematically derive deviations from the
demanded safe behavior to identify hazards. The hazards
regarding longitudinal behavior can be formulated to:
H-1: Automated vehicle does not react to pedestrians.
H-2: Automated vehicle approaches ped. crossing too fast.
H-3: Automated vehicle does not stop in front of pedestrian
crossing with pedestrians present.
According to Reschka and Maurer, an automated vehicle
operates in a safe state when ’the vehicle is driving automat-
ically within its functional boundaries, especially with safe
speed and adequate safety distances.’ [30]. To mitigate some
of the identified hazards, we can state the externally visible
behavior required to maintain a safe state as the safety goal:
SG-1: Approach pedestrian crossing with adequate speed.
The example scenario holds many vaguely described com-
ponents such as weather, exact speeds and distances, and
intentions of other traffic participants. In real world traffic,
many variations of a single scenario can be encountered. This
makes it impossible to derive concrete values as technical
requirements at this stage of the process for all variations
of a given scenario. An approach to address the complexity
arising from all possible variations, is a step-by-step process,
resolving these vague descriptions.
In a first step, we formulated the safety goal also containing
the vague term adequate, which subsumes several technical
requirements. By determining influences which resolve the
term adequate to concrete values, decisions for safe behavior
are moved from the design phase to runtime decision making.
In order to enable and argue safe behavior, we need to model
influences on decision making as well as interdependencies
of these influences in an explicit manner and allocate it to
architectural views which represent the concerns of safety
requirements. This concept gives the system the ability to act
self-aware within its functional boundaries which are identified
and elaborated in the following by looking at a possible worst
case in our example scenario: Pedestrians suddenly emerging
from the occluded space.
Lin [31] motivates thought experiments for situations which
are not very likely to happen, but still possible to occur. Many
of these experiments are “no win scenarios”, which cannot be
resolved correctly or in a completely safe manner (such as
the trolley problem). For the given scenario, one of the worst-
case expectations would be a pedestrian suddenly appearing in
front of the vehicle as soon as it enters the occluded pedestrian
crossing, even at low speed. The most conservative driving
strategy in our scenario would thus be to reduce speed while
approaching the pedestrian crossing and come to a full stop
in front of the crossing for every possible variation of the
scenario. A human driver, in contrast, will at some point
(or distance) decide to pass the pedestrian crossing at an
individually chosen speed, reflecting the personally accepted
risk3.
Our example scenario contains inner city speed levels,
where stopping a vehicle is not a very unusual behavior
and does not compulsorily result in an unsafe state for the
passengers in the automated vehicle. For this reason, we for-
mulate the risk minimal state (RMS) for passing the pedestrian
crossing below a certain distance, which only leaves mitigation
strategies as a choice:
RMS: Come to complete stop.
As automated vehicles shall fulfill the human’s driving
task, we must explicitly determine the boundary (in this case
distance and speed) between the safe state by fulfilling the
safety goal and a state which only allows mitigation strategies
in order to fulfill the driving mission. The boundary (or
point of transition to mitigation-only strategies) has to be
determined by an acceptable risk which is not yet commonly
defined. However, when considering a release process for
automated vehicles, this boundary must be explicitly modeled
in the design process and has to be documented for traceable
arguments of safety and remaining risks. Fig. 3 shows the
relationship of the safe state by fulfilling the safety goal and
the risk minimal state over the distance of the vehicle to the
pedestrian crossing.
As introduced, we want to achieve safety in the aspect of be-
havioral safety but also implement the resulting requirements
functionally safe. Functional safety mainly deals with E/E-
failures which can occur at any time during the operation of
the vehicle. This is the main reason why functional safety
can be expressed and treated through failure rates and not as
behavioral safety with scenario-dependent driving strategies.
Some of the failures such as power related issues make it
impossible to maintain a safe driving state as demanded by
the safety goal. Thus, a transition to the risk minimal state is
3This implies, that each driver will chose a different speed based on her or
his personality and current state of mind.
Fig. 3. Relationship between safety goal and risk minimal state
also the fall-back strategy for E/E-failures where degradation
is not applicable.
Since the transition to the risk minimal state can be imple-
mented by the braking system with a fail safe state of brakes
closed, we will further explain the development of possible
strategies to achieve the safety goal. For this case, the term
adequate depends on several aspects of the current driving
scenario but also on the system state in terms of a system
health. Exemplary aspects are explained in the following,
consider also [32] for additional metrics:
1) Current detection range: In the best case, the current
detection range is similar to the maximum range which can
be derived from the data sheets of the environment sensors
and possible restrictions of this range due to processing steps.
In the worst case, the detection range can be severely im-
peded by external influences. Hasirlioglu and Riener [33], for
example, recently presented the influence of weather effects
on automotive surround sensors. In case of sensor failures,
the whole system will have to degrade in performance as
the environment and other traffic participants may only be
measured with higher uncertainty. To describe the performance
of the current detection range and quality metrics such as
standard deviations of measured states of perceived objects
(e.g. dimensions, relative position, velocity, etc.), and the
explicit representation of visible areas in the current scene
can be used.
2) Maximum deceleration and minimum stopping distance:
The possible maximum deceleration and resulting minimum
stopping distance on the one hand depends on the maximum
applicable brake pressure, as well as the tire state (e.g. tem-
perature), and the mass distributed in the vehicle. In addition
to these vehicle-related properties, external influences, such as
the road condition, determine the friction coefficient between
the road surface and the vehicle’s tires impact the minimum
stopping distance. As a result, in order to determine an
adequate speed to approach a pedestrian crossing, the vehicle
needs to know its own capability to brake but also the road
conditions in the current scenario.
3) Unknown objects in the current scene: A major influence
on the determination of the term adequate is the treatment
of uncertainty in the perceived scene. Position and motion
of objects around the ego vehicle can only be determined
with limited accuracy and are always subject to noise. In
addition, parts of the environment may be occluded for optical
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sensors, while it could be assumed, that objects can emerge
from every such occluded area. This leads to the necessity of
making assumptions in terms of worst-case predictions for the
movement of visible objects and existence of occluded objects
[34]. The assumptions made in this context determine the vehi-
cle’s behavior significantly, depending on how conservative the
predictions are. Hence, the determination of adequate speed
in the scenario (c.f. exemplary safety goal) depends on the
acceptable risk the system is allowed to take.
To conclude the exemplary aspects which influence the
chosen adequate speed in our scenario, the vehicle needs a
self perception as part of a safety concept, besides a scene
representation containing explicitly formulated occlusions and
free space. Only by combining both aspects, safe decisions
and a trade-off between risk and safety can be achieved by
determining the boundary for the transition into a risk minimal
state. In the following, we show how these aspects can be
modeled in a functional system architecture, which represents
the structure and information flow, but also in an capability
based view on the system, which builds the model for a self
perception.
B. Functional system architecture
Fig. 4 shows a part of our functional system architecture
based on the initial work of Maurer [18] and Matthaei and
Maurer [35] and a refinement for the use of a model predictive
control approach for trajectory planning of Nolte et al. [36].
Since functional architectures are a very common view on
systems, we briefly want to introduce the “visible” aspects of
a self-perceiving safety concept. Input to the guidance and the
situation assessment block is the scene which is aggregated
from sensor processing, model based filtering and augmen-
tation of objects with semantics from the infrastructure. The
guidance block holds the functional components for behavior
decisions on the tactical level. This is the most central point to
influence the externally visible behavior which implements our
requirements of behavioral safety. Based on Nolte et al. [36],
we separate the functional components in the guidance block
to situation assessment experts4 and capability monitoring.
The functional system architecture shows data flow, thus it
visualizes which information both components receive and the
output generated towards behavior generation. This structural
viewpoint does not change for different scenarios and thus
requirements regarding performance cannot be analyzed or
modeled further in this view on the system.
C. Self-perception as part of a safety concept
What changes between scenarios, however, is the required
system performance for fulfilling the system’s mission: A
tightly packed maneuvering space with moving objects and oc-
cluded areas e.g. requires more precise perception, localization
and control, compared to a highway scenario. Accurately as-
sessing the system’s performance is a non-trivial task, because
of the huge number of interdependencies between functions,
as well as software, and hardware components in a system.
On the other hand, influences on a functions’s performance
cannot directly be derived from data flow in the functional
architecture. Consider a lateral control task as an example:
While its performance on a behavioral level depends on the
quality of the generated set points, the control performance
also depends on the available actuators: Inaccuracies in the
context model, e.g. caused by a lack of performance in the
environment perception system, manifest in inaccurate set
points for trajectory generation and thus control. On the other
hand, failures in the actuation system cause a degraded control
performance.
While the former dependency can be derived from infor-
mation flow, the latter dependency can not be easily derived
from the functional architecture. For this reason, we have
extended the work of [19] and [20] by introducing skill &
ability graphs [23], [37] for applications in the development
process and at runtime. These graphs explicitly model external
system behavior and the necessary dependencies for perfor-
mance assessment in terms of dependent capabilities which
are required to fulfill the system’s mission.
For comprehensive performance monitoring, data from large
parts of the system is required (cf. [38]), while the information
generated from the monitors is mainly utilized for decision
making. Considering this and the partial independence of
performance indicators from information flow in a func-
tional architecture motivates the introduction of an additional
capability viewpoint. We place the dependency graphs for
performance assessment in this viewpoint, complementing
the existing architectural framework presented by [11]. A
skill graph showing the required skills for approaching the
crosswalk in the given example scenario is depicted in Fig. 5.
As part of a safety concept, the introduction of this addi-
tional capability viewpoint provides several benefits: The skill
nodes can be detailed from a behavior to a technical level. By
4Experts are meant as functional components which are capable of assessing
parts of the whole driving task.
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annotating requirements to the skill nodes, the graph can assist
in detailing the formulated coarse functional requirements to
technical requirements.
Performance metrics for runtime monitoring can then be
derived from annotated requirements. We consider the capa-
bility viewpoint an intermediate representation of (cf. Fig. 6)
a functional and a software viewpoint (e.g. represented in
a component architecture). Formulating correspondences and
correspondence rules around the capability viewpoint eventu-
ally enables tracing the system’s external visible behavior to
software behavior or hardware properties, as will be described
in the following.
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Establishing traceable and consistent relations between ar-
chitectural viewpoints has been widely discussed in the past
(cf. [39], [40]). A promising approach in this context is to
use correspondence rules as guidelines to formulate model
transformations between different viewpoints ([39], [40], [41]),
thus providing a formalized way of storing correspondences.
These formal model transformations are often represented as
graph transformations ([40], [41]), e.g. as n : m mappings
between nodes and edges, while nodes represent (functional,
software, hardware, etc.) components and edges represent
interfaces. For formal definitions of such transformations, refer
to [40], [41]. The component transformations are indicated
as red arrows in Fig. 6, implying that a functional block
can be mapped to specific capabilities, which can in turn
be mapped to software components, which are assigned to
hardware components. The traceability towards the system’s
external behavior demanded above can then be reached by
additionally annotating the formulated requirements to the
respective nodes and edges in the graphs.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we discussed the necessity of architecture
frameworks for automated vehicles from a safety perspective
with behavioral safety as a major concern. The introduction of
an additional capability viewpoint in an architectural frame-
work assists the decomposition of functional requirements into
technical requirements in the development process. Perfor-
mance monitoring presents a possibility to perform a trade-
off related to the risk involved in the automated vehicle’s
actions. By including system performance in decision making,
premature design decisions about acceptable risk can be moved
from the design phase to runtime.
Future research will on the one hand focus on further
integrating the presented architecture framework into devel-
opment processes and evaluate traceability from the concept
phase of an ISO-related design process to test and validation.
It is also to be determined, how the specification of the
different viewpoints holds in iterative design processes such
as presented by [42]. An additional track of research will aim
at formalizing the necessary model transformation around the
capability viewpoint.
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